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Abstract
This case study discusses the economic, legal, and ethical considerations for
conducting clinical trials in a controversial context. In 2010, pharmaceutical giant Roche
received a shame award by the Swiss non-governmental organization Berne Declaration and
Greenpeace for conducting clinical trials with organs taken from executed prisoners in China.
The company respected local regulations and industry ethical standards. However, medical
associations condemned organs from executed prisoners on moral grounds. Human rights
organizations demanded that Roche ended its clinical trials in China immediately.
Students are expected to review the economic and ethical issues regarding the
outsourcing of clinical trials to controversial human rights contexts, and discuss how to make
business decisions when there are conflicts between making profit and ethical considerations.
Was Roche complicit in the human rights violations that were related to its clinical trials?
Future patients might benefit from these clinical trials. Do profit and the greater good, in
general, trump morals?
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Introduction
In 2010, Swiss pharmaceutical giant Roche received the Public Eye Award.
Unfortunately, receiving this shame award was nothing to be proud of: The Public Eye Award
was given to corporations for their irresponsible behavior that had negative social, ethical,
and/ or environmental side effects on stakeholders such as workers, local communities,
consumers, the environment, or society at large. Previously awarded corporate actions
included exploitative working conditions, environmental disasters, human rights violations, or
corporate greed. The Swiss non-governmental organization (NGO), Berne Declaration and
Greenpeace justified Roche’s nomination for the 2010 Public Eye Award as follows:
“China proudly proclaims that roughly 10,000 organ transplants take place annually
in its clinics. However because of Chinese culture, there are few voluntary organ donations
from the population. Where do all the transplanted organs come from? At the end of 2008, the
Chinese vice health minister admitted in a medical journal that more than 90 percent of all
transplanted organs come from executed prisoners. The World Medical Association and other
international organizations unanimously oppose the transplantation of prisoner organs on
ethical grounds. Even when a prisoner supposedly consents to an organ donation, such
consent while imprisoned cannot be considered of one’s own free will. The drug CellCept,
from the Roche pharmaceutical firm, prevents the rejection of transplanted organs. Roche
markets the drug in China despite the country’s unethical transplantation practices. The
company has even been producing CellCept in China for several years. Furthermore, Roche
is currently studying the drug’s effects in two studies with some 300 transplanted organs in
Chinese clinics. Roche claims to have no information regarding the origins of the
transplanted organs. The firm must therefore immediately halt these studies since it cannot
ensure that none of the organs come from prisoners” (The Public Eye Awards, 2010).
Despite an invitation, none of Roche’s representatives attended the award ceremony.
Roche, however, anticipated information requests from its stakeholders (e.g., shareholders,
employees, and patients). The key question was how to respond to this negative publicity.
It was true that Roche was conducting clinical trials in China involving organ
transplantations. However, the company was only responsible for the conduct of the trials. It
did not provide the organs. The organ provision was the responsibility of the collaborating

hospitals, doctors, and the Chinese regulators. Were the claims by the Berne Declaration and
Greenpeace justified? Did the organs come from executed prisoners? If yes, would that make
Roche complicit and responsible as the NGOs claim? Would Roche have to terminate the
ongoing trials immediately? If yes, on which legal or ethical grounds?

Roche – a company overview
Roche is one of the largest pharmaceutical corporations in the world. The Swiss-based
company employs over 80,000 people, and sells its products in more than 150 countries in the
world. In 2010, the corporation achieved revenue of $51b, an operating profit of almost $17b,
and net income of $12b (Roche, 2011a).
Roche describes itself as a research-focused and innovative healthcare provider. Its
business is divided in two main divisions: diagnostics and pharmaceuticals. Roche’s
diagnostic products range from tools for disease detection, screening, and evaluation to
disease monitoring. Examples of Roche’s diagnostic products are testing devices and
analyzers for hospitals and other laboratories. The diagnostics division accounts to roughly 22
percent of the company’s sales (Roche, 2011a).
The majority of Roche’s profit, however, comes from pharmaceuticals (78 percent).
The company manufactures and markets drugs in five therapeutic areas: oncology, virology,
inflammation, metabolic disorders, and central nervous system. Roche is the world’s leading
cancer drug manufacturer. Its cancer drugs (e.g., Avastin, MabThera/Rituxin, or Herceptin)
alone account for over 50 percent of company sales (Roche, 2011c).
Roche has been constantly working on the improvement of its existing drugs and on
the development of new drugs. Research and development is crucial in the healthcare
industry, and Roche invests over $9b per year in research and development. In 2010, Roche
had more than 100 projects that were in the pipeline, and already tested on humans (Roche,
2011a, d).

Roche’s CSR activities
As a pharmaceutical company, Roche’s business is crucial for society. The company
develops products to save and prolong life, and addresses unmet medical needs. Operating in
such an industry calls for special responsibilities. Roche is aware of its responsibilities and
takes them seriously. The company is committed to “running our business in a way that is
ethical, responsible and creates long-term value for stakeholders” (Roche, 2011a: 102).
Roche reports regularly on its approach to corporate social responsibility (CSR) in its
annual report. The company specifically addresses the expectations, needs, and demands of its
core stakeholders: patients, employees, society, and investors. Its CSR activities range from
training employees, respecting worker and human rights, supporting humanitarian and social
projects, risk and crisis management, to sustainable supply chain initiatives, responsible
marketing, and animal welfare (Roche, 2011a).
As Roche’s main activities involve the development and testing of drugs, the company
puts a special focus on providing value to patients. The company advances, amongst others,
the following principles in regards to patients as stakeholders (Roche, 2011b):


Demonstrating the medical and economic value of their products



Ensuring patient safety



Listening and responding to customers’ views



Building relationships with patients groups



Helping to improve global access to healthcare



Running safe and ethical clinical trials

The last two principles are especially important in the healthcare industry: Providing
access to healthcare, and providing safe and ethical clinical trials. To provide global access to
healthcare, Roche follows sustainable patent and pricing policies (Roche, 2011a). Roche

knows that some of its products are desperately needed in developing countries. Therefore,
the company does not enforce any patents for products in the least developed or low-income
countries. Also, Roche supports international initiatives to improve cancer care in Africa. To
secure medicine access in developing countries Roche introduced a specific pricing program
to ensure that patients in those countries can get access to drugs for cancer, hepatitis C, or
rheumatoid arthritis. For example, Roche “negotiated commercial access programs in middleincome countries for our hepatitis drug Pegasys, as well as for our cancer drugs Avastin,
Herceptin, MabThera and Tarceva” (Roche, 2011a: 108).

Roche’s clinical trial policies
Besides its patent and pricing policies, Roche also ensures that its clinical trials adhered to
existing safety and ethics standards (Roche, 2011a). Clinical trials are extremely important to
test the safety and effectiveness of a drug – eventually benefiting patients on a large scale.
Clinical trials also offer advantages to participating hospitals through educational, financial,
and medical support. Roche has clear and strict policies in place to ensure patient safety. The
company adheres to the Good Clinical Practice guidelines issued by the International
Conference on Harmonization (2002). The Good Clinical Practice guidelines include the
protection of human rights (patients), standards on how trials are to be conducted, and
responsibilities of trial sponsors, investigators, doctors, and clinical research associates.
Detailed principles include for example that each person involved in the conduct of the trial is
qualified by education, training, and experience, or that each subject (patient) voluntarily
agrees to participate in the trial, and is informed about the procedure, process, and potential
consequences (European Medicines Agency, 2002). 1
As many of Roche’s clinical trials occur in developing countries the company outlines
specific guidelines regarding its clinical trials in low and middle-income developing countries
(Roche, 2008a). In its policy papers on clinical trials in developing countries Roche stresses

that patient safety has absolute priority (Roche, 2008a & 2012). Therefore, the company
ensures that patients participating in its trial are fully informed about the drug and any related
risks, voluntarily consent to the participation in the trial, and have access to the necessary
drugs during but also after the trial to ensure their continuous wellbeing (Roche, 2012). Also,
Roche conducts only clinical trials in countries where it aims to market the drug later (Roche,
2008a). This avoids the notion that patients in poorer countries are exploited for the benefits
of the developed world.
Roche guarantees full transparency and the adherence to highest ethical standards during
their clinical trials (Roche, 2012). “Roche respects human rights and believes that one of its
most important aspects is the freedom to choose. Roche is focused on protecting human
dignity, patient safety, and ethical principles in the conduct of clinical trials” (Roche, 2012:
1/2). The company stresses that its clinical trial policies are universal applying to any country
– developed or developing – where the company conducts clinical trials.
Other pharmaceutical corporations have similar policies in place in regards to clinical
trials in developing countries. The Swiss pharmaceutical corporation Novartis, for instance,
refers to the same international guidelines as Roche: Good Clinical Practice guidelines, the
Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism, and the WHO guiding
principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation (Novartis, 2011; Roche, 2012).
Roche’s CSR approach received external recognition: The company was named
“Supersector Leader” in healthcare for two consecutive years (2009 and 2010) (Roche,
2011a). Despite this recognition of being a leader in CSR in its industry, Roche received
severe criticism involving its product CellCept in 2008 and the following years.

The CellCept Controversy

CellCept was a drug that prevented organ rejection. It was used on patients that had
received kidney, heart, or liver transplantations. The drug weakened the immune system and
thereby increased the chances that the human body accepted the new organ.
Syntex had developed CellCept. In 1994, Roche had acquired the in Palo-Alto
headquartered corporation, and introduced CellCept shortly afterwards to the U.S. and
European markets (Roche Historical Archive, 2008). Later, CellCept was also available in
Russia and China. Roche enjoyed a privileged position in the market with CellCept. However,
during the last years the competition had intensified, and competitors offered good alternative
drugs to CellCept. Also, patents of CellCept had expired in 2009 (Roche, 2011a). Since then,
the competition in drugs facilitating transplantation acceptance had increased. Sales of
CellCept declined in 2010 due to this increased competition (Roche, 2011a). Roche aimed at
offsetting these losses from the expired patent by increasing its market share in markets such
as Latin America and China (Keller, 2010).
Even though CellCept had been marketed for over 15 years, the drug was still tested in
trials in several countries. In 2008, Roche started clinical trials in China in which Roche
combined CellCept with two regiments of reduced calcineurin inhibtors. The aim of the study
was to examine the efficacy and safety of CellCept. The clinical trial included patients having
liver transplantations (Roche, 2011e). In another clinical trial in China, Roche combined
CellCept with cyclosporine A and steroids, and examined the effect on renal function and the
prevention of rejection in heart-transplant patients (Roche, 2010a). Between 2008 and 2010
more than 300 Chinese patients participated in Roche’s clinical trials (The Public Eye
Awards, 2010). Roche has been conducting clinical trials in Shanghai, Zhejiang, Nanjing,
Fuzhou, Peking, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Changsha, Chongquing, Jiangsu, and Xian City
(Keller, 2010). While most of Roche’s CellCept clinical trials in China aimed at investigating
further long-term effects of CellCept and any interactions with other drugs, such trials also

functioned as a marketing tool to get access to hospitals (Keller, 2010). China was one of the
most lucrative markets for its clinical trials on CellCept.

China - an attractive location for clinical trials
Roche was not the only pharmaceutical company conducting its clinical trials in
China. During the last decades pharmaceutical corporations had followed the outsourcing
trend towards China (Einhorn & Arndt, 2008), which was observable in many other industries
such as the garment, toy, or electronics industries (Harney, 2009; Santoro, 2009). China had
developed into a lucrative outsourcing location for clinical trials. A 2008 study by
consultancy firm A.T. Kearney revealed that China was the number 1 location for clinical
trials – before India and Russia (Einhorn & Arndt, 2008).
The reasons why China belonged to the top locations for clinical trials were manifold:
First, it was not difficult to find participants for clinical trials in China. Vital Therapies Inc.,
for example, struggled finding enough patients suffering from hepatitis B in the United States.
In China, however, authorities estimated that there were over 130 million hepatitis B patients
willing to participate in clinical trials (Einhorn & Arndt, 2008). Second, poor Chinese citizens
were highly interested in participating in clinical trials. For them, clinical trials were often the
only option to get medical care. Third, the costs of clinical trials in China for pharmaceutical
corporations were relatively low compared to costs of trials in Western countries, such as the
United States or Europe. Finally, Chinese regulations were more welcoming. Chinese medical
authorities were less risk-averse than their Western counterparts. During the last years China
allowed risky experiments such as stem cell injections or treatments involving the
manipulation of human genes. Also, Chinese authorities allowed the sale of drugs only after
they were tested locally (Einhorn & Arndt, 2008). This meant that if pharmaceutical
corporations wanted to sell their drugs in China, they had to conduct tests and clinical trials
beforehand anyway.

Hence, it came as no surprise that pharmaceutical corporations like Roche or Novartis
did business and invested in China (Roberts, 2009). Novartis, for example, invested over $1
billion dollars in China to setup a large R&D center. Also, most pharmaceutical corporations
conducted clinical trials in China given its business attractiveness.
For Roche’s CellCept, China was especially important, as the country was the second
largest market for organ transplantation (Keller, 2010). CellCept, for example was the third
most important drug for the company in China (The Public Eye Award, 2010). Since 2005
Roche even produced CellCept in China. When Roche opened its manufacturing site in
Shanghai, Roche CEO Franz Humer said that he and Roche welcomed the country’s openness
to organ transplantation compared to other countries such as Japan where organ donation was
controversial as it contradicted Japanese culture and religion (Keller, 2010). However, human
rights activists and NGOs did not agree with Humer’s observation and raised ethical concerns
related to the human rights context in general and organ transplantation in particular in China.

China – a controversial human rights context
NGOs, and governments described the Chinese political system as authoritarian and
oppressive (Amnesty International, 2010a). China had a continuous record of human rights
violations. Human rights activists and human rights organizations reported regular violations
concerning the right of expression, religion, women’s rights, labor rights, and unfair trial
conditions (Amnesty International, 2010a; Egels- Zandén, 2007; Santoro, 2009; Yu, 2008).
Also, NGOs complained about the corruption within the judicial system and police abuses.
Given this challenging human rights situation, multinational corporations operating in China
were continuously confronted with ethical challenges (Krueger, 2009; Tan & Tan, 2009), but
also received some guidance on how to do business in such an extreme context (Hamilton,
Knouse, & Hill, 2009).

For instance, Chinese authorities oppressed and discriminated against ethnic
minorities such as Tibetan or Mongolian (Amnesty International, 2010a). Also, followers of
unregistered or banned religious groups were harassed, persecuted, and imprisoned (Amnesty
International, 2010a). The spiritual group Falun Gong2, for example, was prohibited, and
Chinese authorities continuously discriminated against this spiritual formation (Amnesty
International, 2010a). Falun Gong members were sent to labor camps for re-education
purposes or to prison (Amnesty International, 2010a).

Prisoners and human rights violations
In prison, inmates experienced a variety of human rights violations such as torture and
harassment, or a denial to see their family and lawyers or denial to medical treatment
(Amnesty International, 2011). Also, NGOs criticized other human rights violations related to
prisoners such as unfair trial procedures. Reports suggested that suspects were unfairly
treated: confessions were extracted under torture, access to legal representatives was often
denied, police abuses were reported, and corruption occurred within the judicial system
(Amnesty International, 2010a, 2010b). Finally, NGOs criticized the severity of punishment
that prisoners faced. China belonged to the 56 countries in the world with death penalty and
executions. The death penalty was applied to almost 70 offences, including non-violent ones.
In 2009 for example, a Chinese businesswoman was executed for fraudulently raising funds
(Amnesty International, 2010b). Her lawyer later confirmed that the regular sentence for such
an offence should have been 10 years imprisonment and a fine of up to $73,000 (Amnesty
International, 2010b).
Given all these human rights violations related to prisoners, it is not surprising that
human rights activists, NGOs, and the international community criticized the high rate of
state-issued executions in China. China had one of the largest records of executions in the
world (Amnesty International, 2011). While death sentences were declining worldwide,

international NGOs such as Amnesty International doubted that death sentences were
declining in China (Amnesty International, 2010b). NGOs estimated the amount of executions
in China to be in the thousands (Amnesty International, 2010b). In 2009, “China executed
more people than the rest of the world put together” (Amnesty International, 2010b: 17).
While regime opponents and inmates experienced a variety of human rights violations
during their imprisonment, critics pointed out that human rights violations continued even
after the prisoners’ executions as their organs were taken without the prisoners’ or their
families’ consent.

Organs from executed prisoners and practitioners of Falun Gong
Prisoners had been traditionally executed through shooting. In 2009, Chinese
authorities announced that firing squads would be increasingly replaced with lethal injections,
as this execution method was “cleaner, safer and more convenient” (Amnesty International,
2010b: 13). The outside media, however, reported that the main reason for changing the
execution method was so that transplant organs could be taken from the bodies of executed
prisoners (Amnesty International, 2010b). Chinese authorities proudly stated that there were
roughly 10,000 organ transplantations per year in Chinese hospitals. However, according to
state officials and NGOs between 65 percent and 90 percent of those organs came from
executed prisoners (Amnesty International, 2010b; The Public Eye Awards, 2010).
NGOs, international organizations such as the United Nations, and medical
associations such as The Transplantation Society (2011) criticized Chinese authorities for
retrieving transplant organs from executed prisoners. The World Health Organization (2004)
called for transparency and traceability in its Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue, and
Organ Transplantation. An excerpt of those principles is provided in Appendix A. The
Transplantation Society (2011) doubted that prisoners or their relatives voluntarily agreed to
donate organs. According to human rights organizations prisoners might sign organ donor

agreements under torture. This was in contradiction to all accepted ethical standards in organ
transplantation (World Health Organization, 2004).
Several activists, NGOs, and human rights lawyers have raised specific concerns
regarding the treatment of practitioners of the religious group Falun Gong. In a 2007 report3
David Matas (U.S.-based human rights lawyer) and David Kilgour (former Canadian Minister
of State) stated that organs were taken from specifically practitioners of the religious group
Falun Gong (Matas & Kilgour, 2009). Kilgour and Matas (2009) had proof that, for instance,
organs from Falun Gong practitioners were sold to foreign transplant tourists between 2001
and 2006. In an updated report, Matas (2008) provided further information on the use of
organs from Falun Gong practitioners. Chinese officials took organs explicitly from arrested
and executed Falun Gong practitioners (Matas, 2008). According to Matas (2008) evidence
existed that blood from arrested Falun Gong practitioners was systematically tested while
blood from other (non-Falun Gong) prisoners was not. As a matter of fact, the amount of
organ transplantation in China had significantly increased with the rising persecution of Falun
Gong since the beginning of the 2000s. Matas’s (2008) report to the United Nations, as well
as Matas and Kilgour’s (2009) book have been independently reviewed and confirmed by
representatives of universities and transplant surgeons. Even within China, the usage of
organs from executed prisoners was criticized: The Chinese vice-health minister admitted that
prisoners were “definitely not a proper source for organ transplants” (Amnesty International,
2010b: 13).

Clinical trials and violations
NGOs did not only criticize the dubious organ sourcing practices from executed
prisoners and followers of Falun Gong. NGOs also criticized the general terms and conditions
of clinical trials in China: Chinese authorities tended to allow risky experiments that were
considered unethical or too risky in other countries such as stem cell injections or treatments

involving the manipulation of human genes (Einhorn & Arndt, 2008). Also, it seemed that
patients were not always fully informed about the trial conditions. Some patients were not
even informed that they were actually participating in trials, and receiving non-approved
treatments. For some sick people the participation in clinical trials was the only option to
receive treatment, as they could not afford any medical treatment.
Human rights organizations and other activists were afraid that poor and uneducated
citizens in China were exploited and even coerced in participating in clinical trials (Simons,
2005). The medical system in China was underfunded and regulations were poorly enforced.
This opened the door for rather dubious clinical practices: Review boards of clinical trials in
China, for example, did often not include ethicists and focused rather on the interest of
hospitals and their doctors (Simons, 2005). Given the underfunded medical system, money
from foreign pharmaceutical corporations for clinical trials was often the main source of
income for Chinese hospitals. Given the favorable conditions for clinical trials in China as
discussed in previous sections, it came as no surprise that many pharmaceutical corporations
had entered the Chinese market. However, this rapid growth posed challenges for Chinese
regulators, as they might not be able to follow up on ethical standards at such an accelerating
rate (Simons, 2005). According to Simons (2005) many of the international guidelines for
clinical trials such as informed patient consent, trial inspection by an independent ethics
committee, and on-site monitoring, were hardly met. While such standards sounded great in
theory, they were hardly found in practice – at least not in China (Simons, 2005).

Organ transplantation in China
In addition to the ethical challenges involving clinical trials in China, there were also
ethical challenges involving organ transplantation. Like in most other countries, China had a
shortage of organs. The list of people needing organs vastly exceeded the number of available
donors (Phillips, 2012).

For a long time China did not have any organized, defined organ donation program or
specific laws outlining the donation process (Budiani-Saberi & Delmonico, 2008). The
consequence of the lack of such a donation system was that China was “a major destination
for “transplant tourists”, who cannot get the life-saving surgery they need in their own
countries” (Watts, 2007: 1917). As hospitals and doctors often lacked funding in China they
were tempted to engage in organ transplantations for wealthy foreigners (Watts, 2007). As
discussed earlier, most of these organs came from executed prisoners who often did not
voluntarily agree to be organ donors.
In 2007, the Chinese government introduced new regulations to ban organ trafficking.
The Human Transplantation Act stated that organ donors had to be at least 18 years old and
outlined a registration framework for hospitals that intended to conduct organ transplantations
(Watts, 2007). Also, this regulation banned organ transplantations to foreigners. The aim was
to fight international organ tourism. However, recent news indicated that there was still
significant organ tourism in China (Phillips, 2012). Given the organ shortages worldwide, for
some people the organ black market was the only opportunity to receive an organ in a timely
manner.
Despite China’s efforts to regulate organ transplantations, some questions remained
open. For instance, there was no clear regulation regarding allowing or forbidding sourcing
from brain dead but cardiac alive people. For followers of some religious orientations this
caused an ethical dilemma as organ donation and/or organ sourcing from cardiac alive people
was perceived as immoral for both the organ donor and his/ her family and the organ
recipient.

China’s organ transplantation practices in the spotlight
Already in 2005 the Chinese government indicated that most of the organs that were
used in transplantations in China came from executed prisoners (Actares, 2008a; Keller,

2010). Soon after, Matas and Kilgour (2006) published their preliminary report about organ
sourcing in China and confirmed that executed prisoners (especially Falun Gong followers)
were the main source for organs. Some countries and international institutions quickly
responded: The United Nations, for example, approached the Chinese government in 2006 to
clarify the allegations about organ sourcing from Falun Gong practitioners (Kilgour, 2012).
Similarly, the European Parliament discussed the issue of organ sourcing from executed
prisoners and Falun Gong practitioners and condemned such practices (Kilgour, 2012). Some
pharmaceutical corporations that were conducting clinical trials involving organ
transplantations in China at that time decided to voluntarily end their trials given the organ
harvesting controversy. Novartis and Pfizer, for example, ceased their clinical trials and
business operations related to organ transplantation in China (Kilgour, 2012). Roche,
however, continued its business operations in China and initiated new clinical trials for
CellCept in 2008.

Focus on Roche
While the organ sourcing issues were raised in 2005 and 2006 in the media, human
rights groups approached pharmaceutical corporations directly already at the beginning of the
2000s. Amnesty International Switzerland, for example, raised the issue of organ harvesting
of Chinese executed prisoners with Novartis in 1999 and with Roche in 2003. Novartis was
relatively responsive to Amnesty International’s inquiries and started discussing the problem
with the NGO at the beginning of the 2000s. Roche, however, was less responsive and took a
rather defensive position.
At the end of the 2000s human rights organizations started approaching Roche more
directly (Actares, 2008b): Actares, an organization that represents shareholders for a
sustainable economy, approached Roche during its 2008 annual meeting and criticized the
company’s sale of CellCept and related clinical trials in China (Roche, 2008b). Actares

referred to the controversial human rights situation in China and highlighted that most of the
transplanted organs in China came from executed prisoners and concluded that Roche could
be perceived an “accessory” to human rights violations in China (Roche, 2008b: 5). During
the 2008 general meeting Roche’s chairman reacted to Actares’ allegations by stressing the
importance of drugs such as CellCept. According to Roche the company’s priority had to be
the safety and wellbeing of its patients and the participants of its clinical trials. Therefore, it
would be wrong to stop delivering CellCept to China. Besides, China accounted for only one
percent of the market for immunosuppressants (drugs used during or after organ
transplantations) (Roche, 2008b). Actares and other human rights organizations criticized that
Roche focused on the clinical trial participants only and ignored any ethical concerns
regarding the organ donation side (The Public Eye Award, 2010). Actares continued its
pressure on Roche and regularly addressed the issue of organ transplantation during the
company’s annual meetings.
During Roche’s 2010 general meeting a representative of the Swiss NGO Berne
Declaration criticized Roche’s clinical trials in China once again and described them as
“running counter to international efforts to end unethical transplantation practices in China
and as inconsistent with Roche’s own corporate principles” (Roche, 2010: 6). Also, he went
beyond criticizing the unethical human rights context under which organs were donated and
questioned the general medical value of Roche’s clinical studies in China. The Berne
Declaration and Greenpeace claimed that Roche was conducting the clinical trials less for
scientific purposes than for marketing purposes to gain access to hospitals and thereby
increasing its market share in the country. Roche objected this allegation stating that the
company had its patients’ interests in mind and needed further trials to optimize the drug and
investigate any potential side effects (Roche, 2010b).
The confrontation between Roche and several human rights organizations regarding
the company’s clinical trials in China climaxed when the Swiss NGO Berne Declaration and

Greenpeace awarded Roche the “2010 Public Eye Award” which was given to corporations
for their irresponsible behavior. According to the Berne Declaration and Greenpeace Roche
deserved this shame award because most of the organs used in the company’s clinical trials in
China came from executed prisoners, and Roche ignored the human rights violations related
to this form of organ donation (The Public Eye Awards, 2010).
At the time when the Berne Declaration and Greenpeace initiated its campaign and
awarded Roche the Public Eye Award, Roche was the only pharmaceutical corporation
conducting clinical trials involving organ transplantation in China. Novartis and Pfizer had
already stopped their clinical trials in China because of the rising organ donation controversy
(Kilgour, 2012). Already in 2006 Novartis had announced ending its clinical trials involving
organ transplantations in China (Bryskine, 2012).
The Berne Declaration and Greenpeace invited Roche to the award ceremony in
January 2010, but Roche did not attend. In March 2010 the Berne Declaration tried to hand
over the award a second time during the company’s annual meeting, but again Roche denied
the award stating that the company did not deserve it (Roche, 2010b). Roche defended its
position by stating that it respected Chinese regulations and adhered to the WHO guidelines.
Roche admitted that the company did not know where the organs for its clinical trials came
from (Recht ohne Grenzen, 2010), but it was beyond the company’s responsibilities to
investigate or know where the organs came from. This was rather the responsibility of the
Chinese authorities (Roche, 2010b).
In Spring 2010 NGOs continued criticizing Roche’s defensive position and also
started to encourage pharmaceutical corporations to draft an industry-wide code of conduct to
define guidelines how to conduct clinical trials involving organ transplantations in China
(Koller, 2010). While Novartis responded positively and signaled its willingness to discuss
such a code of conduct, Roche remained silent and did not react to the invitation of Amnesty
International to discuss the possibility of such a code of conduct (Koller, 2010).

When NGOs demonstrated in front of Roche’s headquarters in Basel in Spring 2010,
some activists were invited to talk to some Roche managers about their concerns. During this
conversation, Roche continued justifying its clinical trials in China by pointing out the
importance of such trials for its patients in China and worldwide. Their drug could save lives
and therefore the company could not stop its trials in China. Also, Roche frequently referred
to the fact that it was not doing anything illegal as the company adhered to local Chinese
regulations. Roche admitted that it did not know where the organs came from (Recht ohne
Grenzen, 2010), but stressed that the company was not legally obliged to supply the organs or
ask where the organs were coming from (Triodos Bank, 2010). In addition, Roche stressed
that the company had already positively contributed to crucial changes in Chinese regulation
regarding organ transplantation: Roche had been instrumental in improving Chinese
legislation to ban organ transplants for foreigners in 2007 (Roche, 2010b).
Despite Roche’s defense, human rights organizations kept criticizing the corporation
for its complicity in human rights violations in China and demanded that Roche stop its
clinical trials in China immediately. For the NGOs it was irresponsible that Roche ignored the
organ donation process.
This ongoing public criticism did not only cause bad publicity for Roche: Some
investment banks and CSR rating agencies reacted to the controversy and excluded Roche
from their investment offers such as the Dutch investment banks Triodos Bank and ASN
Bank (ASN Bank, 2010; Matas, 2012; Triodos Bank, 2010). Triodos Bank (2010) justified
Roche’s exclusion from its portfolio like this:
“Roche does not take full responsibility for its clinical trials in China. In our final assessment
we balanced the gathered information and concluded that Roche’s approach to clinical trials
in China is not acceptable. The company’s size and influence warrant a much clearer position
on the origin of transplanted organs. Since the company no longer meets our human rights
minimum standard, it has been excluded from the Triodos sustainable investment universe

and will be removed from all Triodos investments within the short term” (Triodos Bank,
2010).

ASN Bank (2010: 38) included the following paragraph in their annual report to
inform their stakeholders of their decision to exclude Roche from their portfolio:
“Roche, a pharmaceutical company, employs approximately eighty thousand people
worldwide and has production facilities in various high-risk countries, including China. In
principle, Roche has an extensive sustainability policy with clear views on major industry
issues such as animal testing, clinical trials and stem cell research. Moreover, it makes an
active contribution to making medicines available against diseases such as HIV/AIDS in
developing countries. However, last year Roche proved unable to guarantee that it does not
use organs from executed Chinese prisoners in testing its medicines. Roche states that all test
centers have been approved by the authorities and satisfy the standards set by the World
Health Organization (WHO). Nevertheless, we have removed the company from the
universe.”
Roche was the industry’s leader in CSR (Roche, 2011a), but still faced criticism from
human rights groups, activists, and investment banks. How should the company respond to
the Public Eye Award and the negative publicity? Was Roche in any way responsible for the
sourcing of the organs that were used in its clinical trials? How could a company be
responsible for something that it did not support, and did not do? What should the company
do?

Notes
1.

The complete guidelines are available online

(http://www.emea.europa.eu/pdfs/human/ich/013595en.pdf).

2.

Falun Gong is a spiritual discipline that combines mediation, slow–moving spiritual

exercises with moral philosophy. It is estimated that over 100 million people worldwide
practice Falun Gong. Central to Falun Gong’s philosophy are truthfulness, compassion and
forbearance. Through meditation, and movement practices, followers of Falun Gong aim at
achieving a better life, better health, and spiritual enlightment. Falun Gong was first
introduced in China in 1992. Since 1999, China has officially banned the movement, and
persecuted its practitioners. The Chinese communist party considers Falun Gong and its
practitioners as a threat to communism. The persecution of Falun Gong includes propaganda
campaigns, enforced ideological conversion, re-education, violence, torture, forced labor, and
executions (Amnesty International, 2010a).
3.

The report is available online

(http://organharvestinvestigation.net/report0701/report20070131.htm), but an updated version
has been published as a book in 2009 (Matas & Kilgour, 2009).
Appendix A: WHO Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ
Transplantation
1. Cells, tissues and organs may be removed from the bodies of deceased persons for the
purpose of transplantation if:
a. any consent required by law is obtained, and
b. there is no reason to believe that the deceased person objected to such removal
2. Physicians determining that a potential donor has died should not be directly involved
in cell, tissue or organ removal from the donor or subsequent transplantation
procedures; nor should they be responsible for the care of any intended recipient of
such cells, tissues and organs
3. Donation from deceased person should be developed to its maximum therapeutic
potential, but adult living persons may donate organs as permitted by domestic

regulations. In general living donors should be genetically, legally or emotionally
related to their recipients.
4. No cells, tissues or organs should be removed from the body of a living minor for the
purpose of transplantation other than narrow exceptions allowed under national law.
Specific measures should be in place to protect the minor and, wherever possible the
minor’s assent should be obtained before donation. What is applicable to minors also
applies to any legally incompetent person.
5. Cells, tissues and organs should only be donated freely, without any monetary
payment or other reward of monetary value. Purchasing, or offering to purchase, cells,
tissues or organs for transplantation, or their sale by living persons or by the next of
kind for deceases persons, should be banned.
6. Promotion of altruistic donation of human cells, tissues or organs by means of
advertisement or public appeal may be undertaken in accordance to domestic
regulation.
7. Physicians and other health professionals should not engage in transplantation
procedures, and health insurers and other payers should not cover such procedures, if
the cells, tissues or organs concerned have been obtained through exploitation or
coercion of, or payment to, the donor or the next of kin of a deceased donor
8. All health care facilities and professionals involved in cell, tissues or organ
procurement and transplantation procedures should be prohibited from receiving any
payment that exceeds the justifiable fee for the services rendered.
9. The allocation of organs, cells and tissues should be guided by clinical criteria and
ethical norms, not financial or other considerations. Allocation rules, defined by
appropriately constituted committees should be equitable, externally justified, and
transparent.

10. High-quality, safe and efficacious procedures are essential for donors and recipients
alike. The long-term outcomes of cell, tissue and organ donation and transplantation
should be assessed for the living donor as well as the recipient in order to document
benefit and harm.
11. The organization and execution of donation and transplantation activities, as well as
their clinical results, must be transparent and open to scrutiny, while ensuring that the
personal anonymity and privacy of donors and recipients are always protected.

The full list and explanation of the guidelines can be found here:
http://www.who.int/entity/transplantation/Guiding_PrinciplesTransplantation_WHA63.22en.p
df

Appendix B: Methodology
The teaching case study is mainly based on an analysis of secondary data resources. In
addition, the author contacted several human rights organizations to receive further details on
how the NGOs handled their campaign and how Roche reacted to their campaign and
activities. The case focuses on the 2010 Public Eye Award for Roche. Therefore, most of the
secondary data sources are from 2010 or earlier. To obtain a balanced overview of the narrow
issue of clinical trials in China and the broader human rights situation in China, information
was gathered from the pharmaceutical industry, industry associations, the media, academic
publications, and non-governmental organizations.
As the focus of this teaching case study is the moment when Roche received the
Public Eye Award in 2010, mostly corporate communications such as the annual report or
trial information until 2010 were consulted to provide an overview of what was
communicated until the moment when Roche received the award. Luckily, pharmaceutical
companies provide a lot of information on their websites regarding their current clinical trials.

Besides corporate communications, data from industry associations or international
institutions such as the World Health Organization were also reviewed to receive a solid
overview of industry standards regarding clinical trials and organ transplantation.
As the Public Eye Award given by the Berne Declaration and Greenpeace was the
starting point of the teaching case study, data from various NGOs were consulted to verify the
claims made by the Berne Declaration. Reports and other publications by Amnesty
International and the Berne Declaration were reviewed. In addition, the author talked to
representatives of the NGOs to get additional information about Roche’s reaction to the issue
and the campaign, and the reaction of Roche’s competitors to the issue. All these NGOs have
a reputation of being serious, providing conscientious research, and abstaining from any
scandalous activities. To further balance the information received from NGO sources, data
from the media and as well as academic publications were reviewed (Santoro, 2009; Harney,
2009).
Overall, the various sources of secondary data and personal conversation and
correspondence with members of NGOs provide a good overview of the problematic
discussed in the teaching case study.

Appendix C: Teaching guidance
Suggested questions
1. Do a stakeholder analysis: When deciding how to respond to the recent NGO campaign and
activities, which stakeholders should Roche consider?
The key question for students is to think about how Roche should react to the recent
events (NGO criticism and the reaction of some investment banks to exclude the company
from its portfolios). Obviously, there is a conflict between the company’s economic
objectives (i.e. making profit), responsibility towards its patients (providing a wellfunctioning drug), and ethical considerations (human rights violations related to organ

transplantations in China). Thinking about this conflict in terms of stakeholders might help
students in judging the corporation’s responsibilities towards each stakeholders and
evaluating the company’s options.
Students will probably list the following key stakeholders: organ donors and their
families, donor recipients and their families, hospitals and their personnel, future consumers
(i.e. patients) that benefit from the clinical trials; the media, international organizations such
as the United Nation or the World Health Organization, NGOs, CSR rating agencies,
investment banks, business partners, and the government (the Chinese government as well as
the Swiss government). As a follow-up question, students can be asked to rank the
stakeholders and list the top three stakeholders and provide a concrete action plan per
stakeholder. Discussing the different stakeholders, their priorities, and Roche’s
responsibilities towards each of the stakeholders, will illustrate students the complexity of
making decisions when a company is faced with a dilemma between its economic objectives
and ethical responsibilities.

2. Is Roche complicit in any of those human rights violations?
The concept of complicity is anchored in the legal concept of aiding and abetting under
international criminal law (Ruggie, 2008). It implies that actors are responsible for harm if
they assist, encourage, or morally support a crime before, during, or after the execution and if
they know about the crime intention of the party conducting the abuse (Clapham & Jerbi,
2001). In particular there are three different understandings of complicity:
Direct complicity is the narrowest form of complicity and assigns responsibility to
actors for harmdoing if they knowingly contribute to or assist in violations (Ruggie, 2008a). A
wider interpretation of complicity is beneficial complicity according to which corporations are
responsible for human rights violations if they benefit from them without having initiated or
influenced the action leading to the abuse (Clapham & Jerbi, 2001). Finally, silent complicity

builds on the assumption that corporations are responsible for human rights violations even if
they do not benefit from them, have not initiated or influenced them (Clapham & Jerbi, 2001).
Depending on what has been discussed during the course, the students can list the various
forms and conditions of complicity.
The question is whether students agree with the allegations of NGOs that Roche is
beneficially and silently complicit. According to the NGOs, Roche benefits from the
availability of organs in China. This enables the company to conduct its trials in the first place
and to monitor, and improve its drug CellCept. Without the organs from prisoners the clinical
trials might not be possible. Roche might also be silently complicit, as the company has not
objected to the human rights abuses or conditions under which the organs are sourced. Here,
students can also discuss the different reactions of pharmaceutical corporations. Novartis and
Pfizer left China early to avoid any potential complicity while Roche stayed in China and
initiated new clinical trials for CellCept.

3. In 2008, UN Special Representative John Ruggie introduced a framework on business and
human rights to the UN Human Rights Council. Please apply Ruggie’s framework on
“protect, respect and remedy” to the case. What are the relative responsibilities of the
different actors?
According to Ruggie’s framework (2008b), it is the state’s duty to protect human
rights, the corporations’ duty to respect human rights, and the state’s and corporation’s duty to
provide access to remedy.
Protect: The case study makes clear that the state (Chinese government) fails to protect its
citizens from human rights violations. The state does actually the opposite: It conducts or
supports various human rights violations. Looking at China’s long-term record of human
rights violations, it is unlikely that the government changes in the near future. Students can
discuss whether any other state would have a responsibility to protect Chinese citizens from

human right abuses. Also, students might want to discuss whether corporations have any
responsibility to protect human rights when governments fail to do so. Wettstein (2009), for
instance, provides some arguments why corporations have the positive moral obligation to
protect citizens from human rights abuses.
Respect: Ruggie assigns corporations the duty to respect human rights – especially when
local regulations or enforcement do not exist. The corporate duty to respect translates into due
diligence. Students might discuss whether Roche (and other pharmaceutical companies that
conduct clinical trials in China) failed its (their) duty to respect human rights. China’s human
rights violation record and execution policies were publicly known, and criticized worldwide
(as early as 1999 and 2000). The question is whether pharmaceutical companies should have
known that there is a significant likelihood that organs used in their clinical trials are taken
from executed prisoners. Ethical standards of medical associations are clearly opposed to such
a sourcing on ethical grounds.
Here students can discuss how far the corporate responsibility to respect human rights
goes in regards to clinical trials. Roche has been stressing that its primary duty is towards its
patients and the participants of its clinical trials. The company has not considered being
responsible for the organ donation side of the whole process. The key question is whether
pharmaceutical corporations are responsible for human rights violations related to organ
recipients and donors?
Remedy: Both, governments and corporations, have the duty to provide access to remedy.
This might include regulations and systems for investigating and punishing human rights
abuses. Since the Chinese government engages in (authorizes) human rights abuses, it is
unlikely that the state government establishes remedy procedures. Corporations can of course
not directly establish any official regulations or procedures for remedy. However,
corporations can demand more transparency and request information about the origin of the

organs. Students can discuss in how far pharmaceutical companies can provide remedies, and
how such remedies could look like.

4. Please list different options that Roche could do. How might each of these options be
supported using consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethical arguments?
The teaching case study focuses on the moment when the critique against Roche’s trial
becomes public through the Public Eye Award. The key question of the case is then how a
company with a good CSR reputation can react to such allegations.
Most students will probably propose two opposing options: 1) do nothing and continue
business as usual, or 2) stop the clinical trials. However, there are some intermediate options
as well. Depending on the ethical theories and concepts discussed during the course, students
can evaluate and justify any of those options using consequentialist and non-consequentialist
ethical arguments. Alternatively, students can also sort the arguments per option along the
following categories: legal, economic, and moral arguments. In class, students can be asked to
issue a press release in which they summarize the company’s position and further approach to
China. When students discuss the different options and arguments, they might also want to
compare Roche’s activities to the company’s competitors (e.g., Novartis).

Continue
trials, and do
nothing

Legal

Economic

 No legal violation in
China or in the
company’s home
country (Switzerland)
 Avoid legal
consequences from
Chinese partners for
breaking the contract by
simply stopping the
trials

 Cost effective
to conduct
clinical trials
in China
 Keep good
relations with
China and
Chinese
partners
 Existing
contracts need
to be fulfilled

Moral
NonConsequentialist
consequentialist
 Maximizing
 Duty to
profit. China is
stockholders,
a lucrative
who expect
outsourcing
sound and
location (low
profitable
costs, lucrative
business
regulatory
decisions.
framework)
 Duty to
patients, and
 Ends justify
participants of
the means: The
the trial.
clinical trials
will benefit
lots of patients
worldwide

 Avoid any future legal
restrictions by being
proactive
 Avoid potential
lawsuits by families of
executed prisoners
whose organs were
used without consent

 Avoid negative
effect on
reputation, or
stock prices.
 Potential to be
perceived as a
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in the industry
through such a
drastic action
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clinical trials
immediately
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contractual agreements
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clinical
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clinical trials
in China
until
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change by
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stakeholders
to find longterm solution

Courses

 Avoid any legal
restrictions by offering
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China
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continue
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once issues are
resolved



 Positive effect
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initiative.
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2010. Stopping
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immediately
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The case study is primarily written for business ethics and corporate social
responsibility courses at all levels, undergraduate and graduate level. The case study has been
successfully discussed in both, undergraduate and MBA classes. Also, the case was used as an
in-class exam at both levels, undergraduate and MBA levels.

Case objectives
-

Become aware of ethical challenges that can arise in business

-

Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of various moral beliefs and ethical theories
relevant to business practice

-

Analyze the role of due diligence in outsourcing decisions

-

Familiarize students with Ruggie’s “protect, respect and remedy” framework

-

Examine the role of corporate complicity in human rights violations

Teaching the case
The case can be discussed in one class period lasting 60 to 90 minutes. It is advisable
that students prepare the case in advance, so that they are familiar with the issue. The
preparation can range from simply reading the case to writing a short summary of the case, or
to answer some of the questions. A suggested class outline (75 minutes) is provided below:

Introduction (10-15 minutes)
The instructor might begin the class by asking students what they know about the
human rights situation in China. Here, students are likely to refer to the human rights abuses
mentioned in the case.

Group discussion (20 minutes)

Following this short introduction, the instructor could divide the class into several
groups of four to six students each, depending on class size. Each group is asked to represent
one of the stakeholders of the case: Roche, Chinese prisoners (and their families), Chinese
clinical trial participants (and their families), patients, the Chinese government, and the Swiss
government (Roche is a Swiss company). Each group is asked to discuss the case from their
stakeholder’s point of view. The instructor can use some of the suggested questions, and ask
the groups to answer them from their stakeholder’s point of view.
Alternatively, the instructor might want to focus on the following question: Who is
responsible, and what should be done regarding the clinical trials using organs from executed
prisoners? The stakeholder groups have very diverse attitudes towards the issue. For instance,
the Roche group will argue from an economic and legal perspective; the participants of the
clinical trials will argue for the continuation of the trials as the trials are the only option for
most of them to receive treatment; the prisoners might criticize the human rights violations
and unfair treatment and expect help; or the Chinese government group will argue that no one
has the right to criticize the country’s way of governance. If students are given their
stakeholder group and the questions in advance, they can prepare their argumentation in
advance. In that case, the internal stakeholder group discussion can be shortened to 10
minutes, so that there is more time for class discussion (see below).
Alternatively, the instructor can also divide the class in groups and ask each group to
focus on a specific question (examples are given above).

Class discussion (30 minutes)
Coming together again as a class, the instructor can ask each group for a stakeholder
statement regarding who is responsible and what should be done. To facilitate the discussion,
the instructor can summarize key arguments per stakeholder group on a whiteboard or
blackboard while students are presenting their considerations. To trigger a more focused

discussion, the instructor could also present the different options (continue trials now and in
the future, stop trials after the current ones are finished, initiate changes together), and ask
each stakeholder group to evaluate them from their point of view.

Conclusions (5-10 minutes)
If there is time left, the instructor wraps-up the debate. Students might want to know
what Roche did following the critique in 2010. In its 2010 Annual Report, Roche stated the
following:
“Organ transplantation. In 2010 an NGO raised concerns that organs used in two Roche
clinical trials in China may have been harvested without consent, and possibly from executed
prisoners. The trials into the use of the immunosuppressant CellCept in organ transplants
involve 298 patients at 16 accredited transplant centres, and are being carried out to
establish whether the standard CellCept dose will safely and effectively prevent organ
rejection in people of Chinese origin. For clinical trials in China we follow the same
scientific, medical and ethical standards as in all other countries. We support a worldwide
ban on any use of organs from executed prisoners, as well as on the death penalty. However,
as in many countries, Chinese legislation prevents pharmaceutical companies from
determining the origin of transplant organs. We will complete the two trials but have no
plans to carry out further transplantation trials in China at this stage. Any future trials will
continue to adhere to the Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant
Tourism and the WHO Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ
Transplantation. We contributed to changes in Chinese legislation in 2007. As a result of
these changes, the number of transplants from living donors has increased. Efforts to
introduce a system for people in China to sign their consent to donate an organ are also
having a positive effect. We strongly believe that organ do-nation by freely consenting donors
is the most effective way to contribute to an ethical and sustainable solution in this area of
medical practice. We welcome all support in this area, to improve the situation for patients in
need of organs” (Roche, 2010c: 113).

Updates: 2011 and 2012
In May 2011 Roche confirmed that it will not conduct any new trials in China
involving organ transplantation, but intended to finish its ongoing clinical trials (Roche,
2011f). The problem of organ donation from executed prisoners continued and doctors called

for a boycott of “Chinese science and medicine pertaining to organ transplantation” (Caplan,
Danovitch, Shapiro, Lavee & Epstein, 2011: 1218).
While China recently announced to ban organ donation from executed prisoners
(Bradsher, 2012), human rights organizations continue to address the issue (Strassheim, 2011)
and encourage pharmaceutical corporations to draft an industry-wide code of conduct that
would explicitly outline ethical guidelines for organ harvesting and respect the rights of organ
donors and their families.
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